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Recent Developments
FUTURE INTERESTS - Maryland Court Refuses To Imply
A Condition Of Survivorship For The Taking Of A Contingent
Class Gift. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 246 Md. 106, 228 A.2d 289 (1967). MercantileSafe Deposit & Trust Company, as successor trustee, sought a judicial
construction of the residuary clause of the testatrix's will. The ultimate
issue before the court was whether the membership in a class which
was eligible to receive a contingent class gift under the terms of the
residuary clause should be determined at the date that the express contingency occurred or at the death of the testatrix. The clause provided
that the residue of the estate was to be divided into two equal parts
to be held in trust by the testatrix's son John.' The income from one
part was to be paid to the testatrix's granddaughter for life, and, after
her death, the principal was to be divided among the granddaughter's
male children when they reached twenty-one and her female children
when they married or reached twenty-one. The clause also provided
that in the event all of the granddaughter's children should die before
their shares should become due, the property in trust was to go to John's
children. As to the other half of the residue, the will provided that
the income was to be paid to John's children living at the death of the
testatrix until they reached thirty, at which time they would receive
the principal. The granddaughter died without ever having had
children. The testatrix was survived by five of John's children, but
only one of those children was living at the death of the granddaughter.
1. The residuary clause provided:
I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
real and personal, unto my son, John S. Gittings, his heirs, executors and administrators, upon trust to divide the same into two equal parts and thereupon to stand
seized and possessed of one of said equal parts of my residuary estate, upon trust
to pay the interest and dividends thereof as they shall accrue unto my said granddaughter, Eleanor A. Moale, for her sole and separate use for the term of her
life, and from and after her decease, upon trust to and for the benefit of her
children equally between them, share and share alike, and to vest in and to be paid
or transferred to them after the death of my said grand-daughter ....
when
they attain the age of twenty-one years, if male, or if female, when they shall
attain that age or shall marry; and if any or either of them shall die before his
or her share shall become payable as aforesaid, the share of him or her so dying
shall go and be paid or transferred to and amongst the survivor or survivors of
them, share and share alike, payable as aforesaid, and if all of them shall die
before his or her share shall become payable . . . , then the said one-half of my
said residuary estate shall go and be transferred to the children of my son, John
S. Gittings, equally share and share alike; And as to the remaining equal half
part of my said residuary estate, upon trust to divide the same into as many
equal parts as there shall be living children of my son, John S. Gittings, at the
time of my death, and upon further trust to stand seized and possessed of one
such equal part of said half part of my said residuary estate in trust for or for
the benefit of each of the said children of my son, John S. Gittings, to pay the
interest or dividends of the same respectively to said respective children of my
son, John S. Gittings, until they severally attain the age of thirty years, and as
and when they shall respectively attain the age of thirty years to pay or transfer
to them respectively the principal of their shares aforesaid.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 246
Md. 106, 107, 228 A.2d 289, 290 (1967) (emphasis added).
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The remainder interest created in John's children following the
life estate of the granddaughter in one-half of the residue was a class
gift which would vest upon the happening of a stated contingency.
The court held that the stated contingency occurred when the life tenant
died without issue.2 There was no provision in the clause which
specified when the members of the class were to be determined. Therefore the court was compelled to decide whether survival until the occurrence of the stated contingency would be implied as a condition
precedent to taking an interest in the remainder.' If the court concluded
that such a condition should not be implied and, accordingly, that
membership in the class was determined at the testatrix's death, then
the surviving child and the personal representatives of John's deceased
children who survived the testatrix would share equally. However, if
the condition of survivorship were implied, only the child alive at the
time of the death of the life tenant without issue would take.
The surviving child, using the "inclusion-exclusion" rule of construction,4 argued that because the testatrix specifically provided in
the second part of the residuary clause that the other half of the property was to go to the children of John living at the death of the testatrix
and did not so provide in the first part, the testatrix did not intend to
impose that requirement on the disposition in the first part. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that because she had imposed the
condition - "living at the death of the testatrix" - in the second part
of the clause, it was inferable that she wished to impose a similar condition on the disposition in the first part.' The court indicated that a
2. The will did not expressly consider the possibility of the granddaughter dying
without ever having had children, but expressly provided only for the situation where
she had children and they all died before their shares became due. A claim was made
that a partial intestacy should result because the will failed to provide for the contingency that occurred. The court held that no partial intestacy resulted. It interpreted
the phrase, "if all of them shall die before his or her share shall become payable,"
to mean "if there is no child capable of taking." The court determined that this was
a reasonable construction, particularly in light of the strong presumption of law that
where a will contains a residuary clause, every intendment shall be made against there
either being a general or a partial intestacy and the fact that, taking the will as a
whole, the court found that the testatrix intended to dispose of her entire estate.
3. The partial intestacy question, discussed in note 2 supra, had to be answered
before the court could reach the question of class membership.
4. E.g., Wardwell v. Hale, 161 Mass. 396, 37 N.E. 196 (1894). Where other
parts of a will express a clear contingency, a clause not expressing a clear contingency
is presumed to have a different meaning.
5. As a practical matter there was no reliable indication of intent in the instrument. It may have been more reasonable to construe the residuary clause as indicating
an intention to have the class, children of John, determined as of the death of the life
tenant. In reaching its conclusion as to the intent of the testatrix the court in
Mercantile reasoned that because the testatrix imposed the condition - living at the
death of the testatrix - in the second part of the residuary clause, she must have
intended to impose the same condition in the first part. It would seem that a reasonable
and the natural construction would also be that because the testatrix did not impose
the condition in the first part of the clause - the first opportunity to do so - and
did impose it in the second part, she must have intended a different result in the
second. If the condition had been imposed in the first part and not in the second, the
court might have reasonably and naturally inferred that the testatrix intended the
condition, once imposed, to apply throughout the residuary clause, although even this
construction must be made with caution.
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specific reference to the children of John living at the death of the
granddaughter would have been necessary for it to find that the testatrix intended a different point in time for the ascertainment of the class
membership. The court concluded, however, that:
Whether or not the will before us is to be construed as containing
a positive intent that the contingent remainder was to vest in
John's children living at the time of the testatrix's death, we find
that, at the least, there was no clear intention to the contrary and
that under the principle of early vesting, or by analogy thereto, the
remainder provision is to be taken as referring only to John's
children living at the time of the death of the testatrix 0
Thus, after holding that the intent of the testatrix was to determine
the membership of the class at the time of her death, the court held, in
the alternative, that even in the absence of such intent the class should
be determined at the death of the testatrix unless there appears a clear
intent to the contrary.
In so holding, the court of appeals has apparently enunciated a
rule of construction contrary to the rule established in the oft-cited
decision of Dernill v. Reid7 which involved a contingent remainder to
a class, namely, "the children of Henry."' At the testator's death in
Denzill there were six living members in the class, but only three were
living when the contingency - the life tenant dying without issue occurred. The court held that absent clear evidence of the testator's
intent to the contrary, the members of the class to whom a contingent
remainder had been given must be determined as of the occurrence of
the contingency. Accordingly, only those members of the class who
were living at the time of the occurrence of the contingency upon which
6. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
246 Md. 106, 117, 228 A.2d 289, 300 (1967). However, it is highly dubious whether
the principle of early vesting is technically apposite to the facts in Mercantile.
Professor Reno has concluded that:
Where the gift of a future interest to a class is otherwise contingent, that is,
subject to a condition precedent in no way connected with the continued life of
the class members, then a different situation is presented if survival until the
happening of the contingency is implied. In this situation the gift is already
contingent, so the implication of survival until the contingency occurs does not
contravene the policy in favor of early vesting. (emphasis added).
Reno, Further Developments as to the Alienability and Transmissability of Future
Interests In Maryland, 15 MD. L. Rv. 193, 214 (1955).
7. 71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).
8. The relevant part of the clause in Demill provided:
In trust for the use and benefit of my grandson ....
during the term of his
natural life, .. . ; and from and immediately after the decease of [my grandson],
then in trust that the said principal estate and property shall go to and become
the property of the child or children of [my grandson], by him lawfully begotten,
if any, their heirs ....
if more than one, to be equally divided between them
as tenants in common. But in case [my grandson] should depart this life, without
leaving a child or descendant thereof living at the time of his death, or in case he
shoutd have a child, children or descendants of the same living at the time of his
death, and such child, children, descendant, and descendants should all subsequently
depart this life under lawful age, and without issue living at the time of his, her
or their decease, then in trust that the said principal estate and property shall go
to and become the property of the children of my said son Henry J. Willett, their
heirs and assigns, to be equally divided between them as tenants in common.
Id. at 187, 17 A. at 1026.

1968]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

the gift was made had an interest in the remainder.
court concluded:

The Demill

It seems to us to be clear law, as well as good sense, that in a case
like this where there is an ultimate limitation upon a contingency
to a class of persons plainly described, and there are persons answering the description in esse when the contingency happens, they
alone can take. a
Obviously dissatisfied with the result in Demill,1° the court in
Mercantile noted that the rule of the Demill case has been restricted
and then alluded to its past endeavors to avoid applying the doctrine
without, at the same time, overruling it. The commentators" have been
uniformly critical of the Demill principle primarily because no adequate
reason has been articulated for distinguishing between a contingent
gift to a class and a contingent gift to designated individuals; that is,
the Demill rule results in an implied condition of survivorship in the
former situation but not the latter. Writing in 1955, Professor Reno 2
noted that, as of that time, in the only recent case 13 applying the rule,
the remainder failed and the descent of the reversion was to the same
class members who would have taken the remainder if the condition of
survival had not been imposed. The same commentator points out that
in other cases the court has avoided applying the principle by construing
the instrument as referring to designated individuals and not to a class 4
or by finding an intent that membership in the class is to be ascertained
at a date earlier than the happening of the contingency.' 5
Prior to the decision in the instant case, the Supreme judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v.
Weston, 6 had occasion to consider the status of the Demill principle.
The Massachusetts court's analysis of the Maryland cases, coupled with
the Mercantile decision, gives an accurate indication of the status of
the law today. Noting that Demill was "an obscure and confusing
decision,"' 7 the court said:
As the Maryland decisions now stand, we feel constrained to deal
with the Demill rule in the same way that the Maryland court
seems to do, that is to treat it as still existing despite indications .. .that there has been a very real shift away from it ....
9. Id. at 191, 17 A. at 1030 (emphasis added).

10. See also the court's comments on Demill in Baker v. Baylies, 231 Md. 287,

189 A.2d 820 (1962) and in Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 190 Md. 332, 58 A.2d
649 (1948).
11. 2 L. SIMns, FUTURE INTERESTS § 391 (1956) ; Reno, Further Developments

As to the Alienability and Transmissability of Future Interests In Maryland, 15

MD. L. Rgv. 193, 210-15 (1955).
12. Reno, supra note 11.
13. Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 190 Md. 332, 58 A.2d 649 (1948).
14. Chism v. Reese, 190 Md. 311, 58 A.2d 643 (1948) ; Hammond v. Piper, 185
Md. 314, 44 A.2d 756 (1945). If a gift to a class is otherwise vested, i.e., the gift to
the class itself is certain to happen, survival is not implied in the absence of intent
to the contrary. Shank v. Sappington, 247 Md. 427, 231 A.2d 712 (1967).
15. Boynton v. Barton, 192 Md. 582, 64 A.2d 750 (1949). In this case the court
recognized that the rule in Demill was one of construction and not a binding rule of law.
16. 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d 763 (1961).

17. 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d at 767.
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The Maryland court (in considering the application of the Demill
rule) now appears to give weight (although it is not clear how
much) to conflicting considerations analogous to the rule favoring
early vesting and to apply the Demill rule principally in cases where
some testamentary language or background circumstances also
points to the determination of class membership at a future time.' 8
Shortly thereafter, the Maryland court was again faced with the issue.
In Baker v. Baylies,'9 the testator had created life estates in his son
and daughter, and on their death without issue, the remainder was to
pass to the testator's heirs at law. The question presented was whether
the heirs living at the testator's death would take a transmissible interest
or whether only those living at the time of the happening of the contingency would take such an interest. The court concluded that the
condition of survivorship should be implied. The decision, however,
seems to be far from a reaffirmation of the Demill rule. Generally,
when there is a gift to heirs, they are determined at the date of the
named ancestor's death, or at the death of the testator where the named
ancestor dies first, not at the date of distribution. But there is a recognized exception where the prior interest is in a sole heir.2" In such a
case, the date of distribution, that is, the happening of the contingency,
is the crucial date. In Baker, the court found persuasive the fact that
the testator's heirs-at the date of his death were his son and daughter,
the same parties who held the prior interest. 2 ' Although the court was
not dealing with a sole heir, the situation was sufficiently analogous
to justify the court's departing from the general principle. Its reference
to Demill seems inconclusive on the current status of that case. 2
18. 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d at 769-70.
19. 231 Md. 287, 189 A.2d 820 (1962).
20. 3 RzSTATzmjcNT op PROPERTY § 308, comment k (1940); Halbach, Future
Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, Part 1, 49 CALnF. L. Riv. 297,
316-17 (1961). Where the prior takers can be foreseen by the testator as his sole
heirs at his death it is unlikely that he intends to give them an interest 5 AMxRICAN
LAW ol PROPERTY § 22.60 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
21. On essentially the same facts the Massachusetts court in Second Bank-State
Street Trust concluded that there were no reliable indicators of intent and applied
Demill. The court stated that the Maryland courts did not appear to give effect to
the prior interest rule, citing Weller v. Kolb, 128 Md. 221, 97 A. 542 (1916). Second
Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Weston, 342 Mass. 630, 174 N.E.2d 763, 770 n.4 (1961).
However, Weller is consistent with the general view since the holder of the prior
interest was only one of seven heirs of the testator at his death. See 3 RPSTAT MENT
OFt PROPrRTY § 308 comment k (1940); Halbach, Future Interests: Express and
Implied Conditions of Survival, Part I, 49 CALnW. L. Rzv. 297, 317 (1961).
22. However, although the Mercantile rule may apply to all contingent class gifts,
the holding of Mercantile encompasses only class gifts to children. Therefore, a caveat
should be noted with respect to the scope of the Mercantile rule. The holding is based
inter alia, on the fact that the testatrix probably would not have wanted to exclude
the issue of those children who failed to survive until the time of distribution. This
argument becomes proportionately attenuated as the relationship between the members
of the class and the testator becomes more collateral. Thus, it is arguable that the
testator would want to exclude the issue of non-surviving members where, for
example, the gift is to nephews and nieces or to the children of a person not related
to the testator. Moreover, where the class designation is "heirs," "next of kin" or
"issue," the courts have exhibited some tendency to imply survivorship. See generally
Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, Part I, 49
CALIF. L. Rxv. 297, 380-427 (1961); 2 L. SimZS, FUTURE INTERMSTS § 362 (1936);
Trautmnan, Class Gifts of Future Interests: When is Survival Required?, 20 VAND.
L. Rev. 1, 17-23 (1966).
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Perhaps the primary importance of the Baker decision lies in its
approval of the analysis of the Massachusetts court and the rendering
of a decision which was consistent with that analysis, thereby foreshadowing the result in the present case.
From the foregoing analysis, it would seem evident that in the
Mercantile case the court of appeals, on facts substantially similar,
rendered a decision inconsistent with Demill by creating a contrary rule
of construction which is likely to be the preferred rule. 3 Moreover,
State Street, Baker and Mercantile, taken together, strongly indicate
that the Demill result will only be reached where the instrument itself,
or the circumstances, indicate that the testator intended the class membership to be determined at the time the contingency occurs. This is,
of course, saying
that Demill represents no rule at all since intention
24
always controls.
The court cannot be faulted for the promulgation of its new rule
of construction since it is more likely to give effect to the probable
intent of the testator and is consistent with the principle of early
vesting.2 5 However, fault can be found with the court's legal method
wherein it failed to clarify its past equivocation in the area and has
thereby continued to deprive attorneys and lower courts of a clear
guideline for the interpretation of clauses such as were involved in
Mercantile and Demill. Whether or not the court has, in fact, enunciated a rule of construction entirely inconsistent with the Dernill rule
is significant, but what is more important is the need for clarification
to reduce the numerous instances of expensive litigation of such issues.2
Until this is done, the spectre of Dernill will continue to haunt and confuse those who must interpret these clauses and will make it imperative
that draftsmen be specific and detailed as to the intent of the testator:
[R]ules of construction [for wills] are as essential as rules of
construction for deeds or negotiable instruments. Without them
counsel could not advise their clients with any reasonable certainty, for the meaning of a will could not be ascertained until it
had been passed on by a court of last resort.2
23. Cf., Shank v. Sappington, 247 Md. 427, 231 A.2d 712 (1967).
24. McElroy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 229 Md. 276, 283, 182
A.2d 775, 778 (1962). If anything, Demill would appear now to only indicate that
Maryland may find an intent to postpone the determination of the class on facts which
in other situations would be considered insubstantial. Cf., 5 AMtRcAN LAW 01'
PROPERTY § 22.60, at 443 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
25. See 2 L. SImns, FUTURE INTERESTS § 390, at 163 (1936) ; 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
141, 143 (1965).
In general, . . . courts should not readily imply requirements of survivorship.
This position is not merely based on the traditional preference for early vesting
or for early indefeasibility, since that preference itself should have reasons for its
continued existence and should yield when reasons for its application do not exist.
Instead, the reasons asserted for generally opposing implied conditions have primarily to do with the adverse consequences of such implied conditions, particularly
the interference with the probable and natural objectives of a testator or donor.
Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, Part II,
49 CALnF. L. Rzv. 431-32 (1961). See also 3 RESTAT4MENT OF PROPERTY § 261 (1940).
26. Cf., Shank v. Sappington, 247 Md. 427, 231 A.2d 712 (1967) (Demill rule
argued).
27. In re Easter's Estate, 24 Cal. 2d 191, 148 P.2d 601, 604 (1944) (Traynor,
J., dissenting).
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HABEAS CORPUS - The Custody Requirement: Attack On
Sentences To Be Served In The Future. Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d
709 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1035 (1968) (No. 802).
Petitioner Rowe was convicted of rape and sentenced to thirty years'
imprisonment in 1963. Three days later he was tried for felonious
abduction of his rape victim. After the trial court overruled his plea of
former jeopardy, Rowe pleaded guilty to the abduction charge, having
been advised by counsel that the two sentences would run concurrently.
The court, however, imposed a consecutive sentence of twenty years,
bringing the total period of imprisonment to fifty years. Rowe, thus,
would not begin serving the second sentence until the completion of
the first term in 1993. Rowe did not attack his conviction for rape but
sought habeas corpus relief from the abduction conviction, relying on
former jeopardy and the involuntariness of his guilty plea. Claiming
inadequate representation by counsel, the second petitioner, Thacker,
also sought to attack a consecutive sentence to be served in the future.
Rowe is presently eligible for parole in 1975; if his second sentence
were invalidated, parole would be available in 1970. Thacker, who was
sentenced to sixty years' total imprisonment, will be eligible for parole
in 1976, and, even if relief is granted, that date could not be advanced.
Petitioners' appeals to the Virginia Court of Appeals and their habeas
corpus petitions to the federal district court were dismissed on the
ground that petitioners could not attack the future sentences because
they were not yet in "custody" under those sentences within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that a state prisoner's sentence is subject to
federal habeas corpus attack even though it would not begin to run
until the remaining portion of his unchallenged earlier sentence had
been served.
In McNally v. Hill2 the Supreme Court first enunciated the rule
that habeas corpus is unavailable to collaterally attack sentences which
a prisoner has not yet begun to serve. Almost immediately after the
McNally decision, however, the Supreme Court seemingly carved out
an exception to the custody requirement in Ex parte Hull,3 in which
it was held that when parole under an otherwise valid sentence had
been revoked because of a subsequent conviction, a state prisoner would
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964) : "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States ..
" The Maryland Court of Appeals has construed
the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 645A (1965),
which is similar to the federal statute, to permit an attack on a sentence not yet being
served if the prisoner is incarcerated under another sentence. Simon v. Director, 235
Md. 626, 201 A.2d 371 (1964) ; Robert v. Warden, 221 Md. 576, 155 A.2d 891 (1959).
2. 293 U.S. 131 (1934). McNally was charged in a three count indictment with
conspiracy to transport a stolen motor vehicle across state lines, with transporting
the vehicle across state lines and with selling the stolen vehicle in another state. The
sentences imposed under the first two counts were to run concurrently; the sentence

imposed under the third count was consecutive. McNally brought his habeas corpus
petition attacking the consecutive sentence while he was still in custody under the
concurrent sentences.
3. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). The petitioner in Hull was arrested while on parole
and charged with a crime unrelated to the crime for which he was on parole. The
arrest for this second crime was the sole reason for the suspension of his. parole.

19681

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

be allowed to challenge the second sentence without attacking the
validity of the first. While Hull does permit a second conviction to be
subject to habeas corpus attack even though the sentence for that
offense is not presently being served, it would seem that the case can
be explained as being entirely consistent with the notion that present
custody is required for an attack on a conviction. The reason that
the Hull Court permitted attack on the future conviction was that the
validity of the petitioner's present confinement was entirely dependent
on the validity of the second conviction. Thus, the Court arguably
did no more than permit a challenge to the petitioner's present confinement. The fact that the basis for such confinement was a second conviction and sentence to be served in the future should not be viewed
as altering the true character of the petitioner's attack; that is, a
challenge to the legality of present confinement.
In order to grant habeas corpus to the petitioners in the instant
case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had to circumvent two distinct obstacles. First, the McNally decision had never been overruled,
and its edict stood squarely in the way of collateral relief. Secondly,
the court could not overlook the express statutory requirement of
custody. As to the former problem, the Fourth Circuit had previously
eroded the McNally doctrine in Martin v. Virginia4 and Williams v.
Peyton.' In each of these cases, attacks on future sentences were
permitted where those sentences affected eligibility for parole or were
likely to influence the deliberations of a parole board.' In Martin,
collateral attack was allowed where the prisoner would have been
immediately eligible for parole if the future sentence were vacated,
while in Williams, the court went a step further by granting a hearing
to a petitioner who was already eligible for parole on the ground that
the parole board would be strongly influenced by the existence of his
unserved future sentence.
The questions for consideration in the instant case, however, went
beyond both Martin and Williams because the future sentences under
attack would have no effect on petitioners' immediate parole. By granting habeas corpus relief to Rowe and Thacker, the court of appeals
would no longer be merely eroding the McNally doctrine but would
be expressly refusing to follow the Supreme Court's specific holding
in the McNally case. The court agreed that ordinarily it was bound
to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court but claimed that there
were occasions when a lower court should adhere to an apparent tendency of the Court which reflects a departure from an older view and,
if necessary, come to a conclusion not yet reached by the high Court.7
4. 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
5. 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
6. In Allen v. United States, 349 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1965), it was held that a
defendant who was free on bail was not in custody for the purposes of habeas
corpus relief.
7. The court expressed its reasoning in the following language:
This court, of course, must follow the Supreme Court, but there are occasional
situations in which subsequent Supreme Court opinions have so eroded an older
case, without explicitly overruling it, as to warrant a subordinate court in pursuing
what it conceives to be a clearly defined new lead from the Supreme Court to a
We considered . . .
conclusion inconsistent with an older Supreme Court case ....
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In reviewing the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Jones v.
Cunningham"and Fay v. Noia,9 the court concluded that the Supreme
Court would no longer follow McNally. The court invoked the view
of habeas corpus expressed in Jones that habeas corpus ". . . [i]s not
now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope
has grown to achieve its grand purpose . . . ."' Accordingly, the Rowe
court reasoned that the growth of new procedural rights of criminal
defendants which has resulted in recent years from the Supreme Court's
expansion of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment must be accompanied by a parallel development in
the remedies available for the protection of these new rights. Adherence to the rigid doctrine of the McNally case, the court concluded,
would obstruct the evolution of habeas corpus to meet these new needs.
The second obstacle to the granting of habeas corpus to the petitioners in Rowe was the necessity of complying with the express statutory requirement of custody as a prerequisite to habeas corpus relief.
Although admitting that in a technical sense the petitioners were not
officially serving the sentences they were attacking, the court concluded
that a man serving consecutive sentences is, in every practical sense,
serving a single sentence for all the convictions. Thus, a prisoner is in
custody for all his convictions at any one point in the service of that
single aggregate sentence. On the basis of this practical argument, the
court concluded that the statutory requirement had been satisfied."
The court went on to point out that the delay which would result
from a holding that the writ was not available until service of the
future sentence had begun would severely prejudice the cases of both
the defendant and the state. The availability of witnesses and the
accuracy of the recollection of those witnesses who are produced would
[McNally] no longer controlling authority [in Martin and Williams] and we
will adhere to that view until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to declare
what, if any, vitality that case presently retains. Certainly, McNally's doctrinaire
approach and its dealing with the problem in terms of the old jurisdictional
concept have been thoroughly rejected by the Supreme Court in recent cases ....
383 F2d at 714.
8. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). In 1961, the petitioner attacked a conviction which had
been imposed in 1953, claiming that the 1953 conviction was based on an earlier invalid
conviction. Before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit could hear the petition,
the petitioner was paroled, and the state asked the court to dismiss the petition on the
grounds that it had been rendered moot by the parole. The question presented for
review by the Supreme Court was whether a parolee is "in custody" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). The Court held that although the petitioner was
no longer within the custody of the prison superintendent, he was in the custody of the
parole board and, thus, was eligible to petition for habeas corpus.
9. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Fay decision liberalized the doctrine of "comity"
which required a habeas corpus petitioner to first exhaust all the remedies available
in the state courts. Fay held that the petitioner need only exhaust those state remedies
still open to him at the time he applies for habeas corpus.
10. 371 U.S. at 243.
11. An analogous interpretation of a habeas corpus statute may be found in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). That case involved an interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1964), which provides that a prisoner must have ". . . [e]xhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the state . . ." in order to bring a habeas corpus
petition. A "highly technical" interpretation of the statute would indicate that all
state remedies must be exhausted; if a prisoner failed to make an appeal to a state
court within the statutory time limit, he would not have exhausted state remedies.
In Fay, however, the Supreme Court adopted a more practical interpretation of the
statute, requiring only that the petitioner exhaust those state remedies still open to him.
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be greatly reduced. The chance that the prisoner may lose the only
means for substantiating his claim or that the state may no longer be
able to produce evidence to contradict the prisoner's testimony would be
greatly increased by such a delay. The granting of an immediate remedy
would help prevent any such eventualities.
The courts in the other federal circuits, when faced with factual
situations similar to the one in Rowe, have rarely deviated from the
McNally doctrine." Indeed, many of the circuits have extended the
narrow McNally holding to embrace the problem presented by a
prisoner who seeks to collaterally attack an invalid sentence when he is,
at the same time, serving a valid concurrent sentence.'" This expansion
of the McNally doctrine has been predicated on the theory that habeas
corpus is not available where a decision favorable to the prisoner would
not result in his immediate release, a proposition which is supported
only by dictum in McNally. 4 The strict holding of McNally, that
habeas corpus is not available to attack a sentence to be served in the
future, is based on the theory that the granting of habeas corpus in
such a situation would be premature because the prisoner is not yet in
custody under the sentence he is attacking. This theory is not applicable to a collateral attack on a concurrent sentence, since the prisoner
is clearly in custody under that sentence when the suit is brought. The
justification for denying habeas corpus to prisoners attacking concurrent sentences is that the decision in such a case is rendered moot by
the existence of a valid concurrent sentence. While Rowe rejected the
prematurity theory by permitting an attack on a future sentence, its
reasoning does not authorize an attack on a present sentence where
such an attack would be rendered moot by the existence of a valid
concurrent sentence. If, however, the granting of habeas corpus relief
in such a case would not be moot because it would result in a reduction in the prisoner's total sentence or in an increase in the prisoner's
chances for parole, the reasoning of the Rowe court would apply.
The holding in the instant case relies heavily on the court's conviction that the Supreme Court, presented with the precise issue raised
in the instant case, would refuse to follow the McNally holding. However, the Supreme Court has given no specific indication that the
McNally decision has lost its vitality, although in the recent case of
5
Walker v. Wainwright,"
which was decided after Rowe, the Court
12. E.g., Gailes v. Yeager, 324 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1963), in which the petitioner
attempted to attack a second consecutive sentence while still serving the first; Moon
v. United States, 272 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1959), in which both habeas corpus and
coram nobis relief was denied because the petitioner had not yet begun to serve the
sentence he was seeking to attack. See also Owensby v. United States, 353 F.2d 412
(10th Cir. 1965).

13. E.g., Johnson v. Beto, 383 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Smiley v. Wilson, 378
F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Wells v.
California, 352 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1965).
14. The recent Supreme Court case of Walker v. Wainright, 88 S. Ct. 962
(1968), has recognized that McNally is often erroneously cited for the proposition
that habeas corpus is not available where the prisoner's immediate release would not
result from a decision in his favor.
15. 88 S. Ct. 962 (1968). In that case the petitioner sought to attack a life sentence which he was serving at the time his petition was brought. The district court
held that habeas corpus was not available because the petitioner would still have to
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restricted the application of McNally to cases falling within its narrow
holding. Unfortunately, the facts in Walker did not justify a reconsideration of the McNally holding. When the issue is squarely presented,1"
the Court will find it difficult to resist the compelling arguments
espoused by the Fourth Circuit in Rowe urging the abandonment of
the anachronistic McNally doctrine. 7

INSURANCE - Damages For Mental Suffering Arising From
Breach Of Insurance Contract. Crisciv. Security Insurance Company,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The plaintiff held a $10,000
general liability policy with the defendant insurance company. The
policy obligated the insurer to defend the plaintiff in suits arising under
the policy and also authorized the insurance company to make any
settlement it deemed expedient. An action was filed against the plaintiff by one of her tenants for personal injuries resulting from a fall on
the stairs of the plaintiff's apartment building. The insurance company
knew large awards were often given for the type of injury alleged by
the tenant,' but nevertheless declined an offer to settle the claim for
$9,000. The plaintiff subsequently suffered a $101,000 judgment.2
The plaintiff, an immigrant widow of 70, became indigent through her
efforts to settle the $91,000 balance. Her desperate financial condition
allegedly caused a decline in physical health, hysteria, and several
suicide attempts. In a suit against the insurer, the California Supreme
Court upheld the plaintiff's recovery of the difference between the policy
limits and the amount of the judgment, finding the insurance company had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3
serve a five year consecutive sentence if his petition was successful. The district
court cited McNally for the proposition that the petitioner could not resort to habeas
corpus because a favorable decision would not result in his immediate release. The
Supreme Court reversed, explaining that McNally applied only to petitioners who
seek to challenge a sentence to be served in the future.
16. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the instant case. 389 U.S.
1035 (1968).
17. The custody requirement is discussed in greater detail in Note, The "Custody"
Requirement for Habeas Corpus, 26 MD. L. Rtv. 79 (1966) ; Note, Habeas Corpus,
Custody, and Declaratory Judgment, 53 VA. L. REv. 673 (1967).
1. The tenant developed a very severe psychosis after her fall. Both the insurer's
counsel and claims manager believed that a verdict of no less than $100,000 would be
returned if the jury believed the fall caused the tenant's psychosis. Both men also
believed the jury would find a causal connection between the psychosis and the fall
unless evidence could be discovered showing the tenant had suffered a prior mental
illness. The insurer's extensive search turned up no evidence that the tenant had any
prior mental abnormality.
2. DiMare v. Crisci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
3. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The implied
covenant for good faith and fair dealing was defined by the court as requiring both
parties to an insurance contract to do nothing which will injure the rights of the other
to receive the benefits of the contract. Since one of the benefits the insured receives is
the settlement of claims without litigation, the implied covenant imposes a duty on the
insurer to accept reasonable settlements. The insurer's liability under the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing will not require a bad faith breach. Liability
will be imposed upon the insurer for merely failing to meet the duty of accepting an
offered settlement, where the most reasonable manner of disposing the claim is by
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The court also reversed a lower court decision4 and allowed the plaintiff
recovery of $25,000 for her mental suffering. The court held that the

plaintiff's mental suffering was compensable since the insurer's conduct
constituted a tort as well as a breach of contract. 5 Thus, under California law, the plaintiff's mental anguish would be compensable, even
if it were not anticipated by the defendant, if it could be shown that
her poor health, hysteria, and attempts at suicide naturally ensued from
the defendant's conduct. However, the court also noted that peace of
mind and security were among the reasons why liability insurance
was purchased. The court indicated that if the plaintiff bought insurance to protect herself from the mental distress which might follow an

accidental loss, such distress may be a foreseeable consequence of the
insurer's breach of the insurance contract.

A conflict of interest arises between insured and insurer when an
injured third party offers to settle a claim within the limits of a limited
liability insurance contract. The insured will want to accept the settlement offer rather than risk the possibility of being held personally liable
for a judgment exceeding the policy limits. On the other hand, the insurer may want to gamble on litigation since its liability is limited by
the policy. Since the typical liability insurance policy reserves for the
insurer the right to make any settlement it deems expedient, the courts
have resolved this conflict by imposing on the insurer a duty to consider the interest of the insured when negotiating a settlement. The
nature and extent of this duty to make a reasonable settlement has
been the subject of some discussion, 6 but little attention has been paid
to the extent of damages recoverable against the insurer for breaching
this duty.
It seems clear that the insurer will be liable for any judgment
against the insured exceeding the policy limits when the insurer has
breached its duty to settle.7 The California courts found no difficulty in
accepting the settlement. The test applied by the court was whether "a prudent insurer
without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer." Id. at 176, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 16. Compare Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., supra, with Noshey v. American
Auto Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934). Noshey required bad faith regarding
settlement negotiations as a prerequisite for the insurer's liability. The requirement of
either fraud or bad faith in order for an insurer to become liable for damages caused
by its failure to settle, once the majority rule, has now gone out of vogue, the courts
generally requiring a more stringent standard in defining an insurer's duty to settle.
But the standard used to define this duty is far from settled; the courts use various
criteria ranging from bad faith to negligence, or somewhere between the two. See
generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
Rtv. 1136 (1954) ; Comment, Insurer's Liability for Failure to Settle, 9 MD. L. Rev.
349 (1948) ; Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955). In Maryland, the insurer's duty includes
elements both of good faith and of reasonable care. Gaskill v. Preferred Risk Mut.
Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 66 (D. Md. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. White,
248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967).
4. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
5. The First District Court of Appeals held that the insured's action for breach
of implied covenant of good faith in a liability insurance situation sounded in contract.
Further, in such an action, the insured cannot recover damages for mental suffering.
Id. at 291. See note 25 infra.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. E.g., United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93,
156 S.E.2d 809 (1967) ; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236
A.2d 269 (1967). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
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awarding the $91,000 difference between the amount of the judgment
and the insured's policy limits.' But the facts in Crisci presented a
further question: Could other special damages9 be awarded in addition
to the amount of the excess judgment? To answer this question, two
issues must be considered: First, the general issue of whether special
damages should be allowed for breach of a duty to settle, and, second,
the more particular problem of whether, if other special damages are

to be allowed, mental suffering damages should be awarded.
Generally, an insurer is liable for all damages which arise naturally"
from the breach of the insurance contract or which may have been
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time they
entered the contract." At best, however, this is a somewhat vague
standard, and the courts have reached differing results in applying it.
Some courts, while applying this standard of damages, have exhibited
what seems to be a reluctance to hold the insurer liable for special
damages. A substantial number of cases have held the insurer not liable
for special damages, excepting interest, when the insurer's breach was
a delay or failure in making payment. 2 These cases take a very restrictive view of the type of injury the insurer should reasonably foresee at
the time it creates the insurance contract. The more liberal courts,' 3
including Maryland, 4 appropriately take into consideration the fact
8. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) ; Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
9. The terms "special damages" and "consequential damages" are sometimes used
interchangeably. For clarity and consistency, the term "special damages" is used
throughout this discussion. For a discussion of the meaning and use of these two
terms see 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1011, at 75-77 (1951) (expressing a preference
for the term special damages).
10. The term "arising naturally" was used in Crisci in the tort sense of proximate
cause, which is broader than the contract concept of causation. Compare 5 A. CORBIN,
CON TRACTS §§ 1008, 1011 (1951) with W. PROSSR, LAW or TORTS § 50 (3d ed. 1964).
11. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1007, 1011 (1951).
12. E.g., New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872);
Scottish Union and Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Schornick
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 277 Ill. App. 36 (1934) ; General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W2d 685 (Ky. 1966); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Jackson, 340
S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1960); Clark v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968
(1932); Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582
(1920); Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 448, 176 S.E. 340 (1934) ;
Gross v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 538 (1954).
13. E.g., Alliance Ins. Co. v. Alper-Salvage Co., 19 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1927)
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Westerfield, 189 Ark. 476, 73 S.W.2d 155 (1934); Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933).
14. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmer's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181
Md. 295, 19 A.2d 653 (1943). In this case the insurer, having agreed in its liability
policy to defend the insured in a suit, refused to do so on the erroneous assumption
that the insured's accident had not occurred within the area covered by the policy.
The suit ended in a judgment against the insured, and subsequently his truck and
trailer were sold at a sheriff's sale. In his suit against the insurer, the insured was
allowed as special damages the value of the truck and trailer. The Maryland Court
of Appeals held that an insurer who has breached its liability insurance policy will be
responsible beyond the face value of the policy for all damages "as may reasonably
be considered as arising naturally from the breach of the contract ..
" Id. at 300-01,
29 A.2d at 656. See Note, Damages for Breach of Automobile Liability Insurance
Contract, 7 MD. L. Rev. 260 (1943). A District of Columbia case has concluded that
an insurer's duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay for a judgment and that
under certain circumstances an insurer may be compelled to pay the cost of defense
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that liability insurance is meant to be more than the mere agreement
to pay money upon a contingency. It is the nature of the contingency
which distinguishes liability insurance from other agreements Jo pay
money; usually the contingency is a critical situation against which the
insured has purchased the insurance for protection and security. Under
these circumstances the insurer should foresee not only a loss of interest
when it fails to pay but also other damages resulting from the loss of
protection for which the insured contracted. Likewise, when the insurer
breaches its duty to settle, it should foresee not only the possibility of
a judgment against the insured exceeding the policy limits but also
the chance of other damages resulting from the loss of security and
protection.
Even if other special damages are recoverable, there still remains
the question of whether these damages will include claims for mental
suffering. Mental suffering damages are generally held to be too remote
and speculative to be awarded for breach of contract.'" It is often said
that recovery for mental suffering will be denied unless the breach also
constituted a willful and independent tort.

6

However, there have been

a few decisions allowing such damages when mental suffering was a
reasonably foreseeable result of the breach and where the contract's
primary purpose was mental security and comfort rather than pecuniary
gain. 1 7 Insurance contracts are usually of this nature, but there has

even though not liable to pay the judgment against the insured. Boyle v. Nat'l Cas.

Co., 84 A.2d 614 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1951). The court in Boyle found, however,
that an insurer is not bound to defend suits involving claims which are clearly beyond
the limits of the policy. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania Thresherman and Boyle, considered together, indicate that an insurer who has wrongfully refused to defend the
insured may be liable for the cost of the defense plus any special damages arising from
its failure to defend, although not liable for the judgment itself because the judgment
was not covered under the policy.
15. E.g., Westwater v. Grace Cathedral, 140 Cal. 339, 74 P. 1055 (1903). See
W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 93, at 641 (3d ed. 1964).
16. See Annot, 88 A.L.R.2d 1367 (1963).
17. In an action by a woman, whose child was stillborn, against a physician for
failing to perform a Caesarean section as agreed, the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that the evidence sustained the finding that the baby would have lived had the
promised operation been performed and that the woman was entitled to recover for
pain and suffering resulting from the physician's failure to perform his contractual
obligation.
When we have a contract concerned not with trade and commerce but with life
and death, not with profit but with elements of personality, not with pecuniary
aggrandizement but with matters of mental concern and solicitude, then a breach
of duty with respect to such contracts will inevitably and necessarily result in
mental anguish, pain and suffering. In such cases the parties may reasonably be
said to have contracted with reference to the payment of damages therefor in
event of breach. Far from being outside the contemplation of the parties they are
an integral and inseparable part of it.
Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816, 824 (1957).
Mental suffering damages have also been recovered on contracts of a less personal
nature. In F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630
(1932), the defendants installed a roof on the plaintiff's house which leaked to such
an extent that the plaintiff's comfort was disturbed and she became ill. The defendants
took no steps to correct the leak although they were repeatedly notified of its existence. Plaintiff was allowed recovery for mental anguish in her action for breach of
warranty. Some courts have allowed recovery of mental suffering damages for the
breach of a contract to furnish goods for a wedding. Compare Lewis v. Holmes, 109
La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) (a failure to deliver the wedding trousseau) and Browning
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been a reluctance to award special damages for mental suffering resulting from their breach.'" Such damages have been denied even when the
insurer was aware of the fact that mental anguish was almost certain
to occur. 9 The courts are hesitant to allow mental distress damages
for breach of an insurance contract for apparently the same reasons
they disallow these damages for breach of a general contract; they view
mental suffering damages with suspicion and hold such damages too
uncertain to be foreseeable by the insurer.2 0 These courts feel that an
insurer has no intent, when making the insurance contract, to subject
itself to liability for something as subjective as the insured's mental
distress. Moreover, they conclude that the insurer has only promised
to pay for a loss; if the insurer has also promised to pay for a loss
caused by its failure to pay the original loss the insurance contract could
be telescoped into an infinite number of promises. 2 '
Prior to Crisci there seems to have been only one case in which
mental suffering damages were recovered from an insurer. In Miholevich v. Mid-West Mutual Auto Insurance Company,22 the insurer
breached its liability insurance contract by refusing to pay a judgment
against the insured until after the insured had been imprisoned on a
body execution. The Michigan court allowed the plaintiff compensation for his shame and mortification, holding that the insurer might
naturally expect these damages to follow from the breach. The damages,
therefore, were awarded on a contract theory. The Crisci opinion also
recognizes that mental suffering damages awarded for a breach of
this type of contract should be reasonably foreseeable. As the California Supreme Court stated: "Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind
and security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss. .. "23
By basing its award on the tortious nature of the insurer's act, the
Crisci decision does not necessarily indicate dissatisfaction with the
contract theory of recovery.14 The court probably felt that while other
damages could be awarded under a contract theory, mental suffering
damages did not meet the "certainty" required of contract damages
v. Fies, 4 Ala. App. 580, 58 So. 931 (1912) (failure to supply a carriage to take the
plaintiff to his wedding) with Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185 (Okla.
1961), noted in 49 CALIn. L. Rev. 751 (1961) (mental suffering damages for defendant's failure to deliver a wedding gown and veil were not allowed because plaintiff's
mental distress was not accompanied by or connected with any physical injury).
18. E.g., Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953);
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Stringfellow, 92 So. 2d 924 (Ala. App. 1956) ; Clark
v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968 (1932). See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d
538 (1954).
19. In Clark v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968 (1932), the
insurer knew the insurance policy on the life of the plaintiff's wife was take to provide
burial expenses. The plaintiff was forced to beg and borrow sufficient funds to bury
his wife after the insurer refused to pay. Held, no recovery for the plaintiff's mental
20. Cf. Emerman v. Baldwin, 186 Pa. Super. 561, 142 A.2d 440 (1958) ; IgSTAvrtMENT OV CONTRACTS § 341 (1932).
21. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1010 (1950).
22. 261 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933).
23. 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
24. But see Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924).
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under Section 3301 of the California Civil Code.25 By finding that the
insurer's act constituted an independent tort, the court could award
mental suffering damages under Section 3333 of the Civil Code, which
allows compensation for all damages "proximately caused" by the
insurer, "whether .. .anticipated or not."'2 6
The question of whether damages will be recoverable under a
tort or contract theory seems to be an important factor in determining
the ultimate issue of whether mental suffering damages will be recoverable. Deciding between tort and contract calls into play the concept of the scope of damages recoverable under each particular theory.
Where damages are awarded on a contract theory, a court must first
find that the damages, in the event of breach, were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.2 7 In Miholevich, the Michigan court found the insurer could -have reasonably foreseen the insured's mental distress.2 Apparently the court realized that the insured
originally bargained for security and peace of mind, not merely for indemnification. Any damage caused by a breaching insurer to the mental
tranquility of the insured should be compensable, since the intent of
the parties when making the contract was to secure that tranquility.29
But while there is agreement as to the test for contractual damages, this
test can only be subjectively applied by the courts. As noted earlier,
some courts have found too remote, damages which other courts have
allowed as foreseeable and within the scope of contractual recovery.
However, it seems that in tort actions the courts have been willing
to include elements of injury which are more remote and less easily
foreseeable than those recognized in contract actions.3 If the insurer's
liability is in tort, the damages need only be proximately caused."'
While some degree of foreseeability is required by the proximate cause
doctrine, this requirement is more easily satisfied than is the contract
25. CAL. CIvinL CoDm § 3301 (West 1954): "Certainty - DAMAG4S MUST BE
No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract which are not clearly
ascertainable in both their nature and origin." In McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App.
186, 3 P.2d 624, 629 (1931), the court expressed the view that, "[d]amages to health,
reputation, or feeling are not clearly ascertainable, either in their nature or origin."
26. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333 (West 1954): "Torts in general - BREACH Os'
OBLIGATION OTHER THAN CONTRACr. For the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, the measure of damages . . .is the amount which will compensate for
all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not."
27. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1007 (1950) ; RPSTATtMXNT Or CONTRACTS § 330
CERTAIN.

(1932).
28. 261 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933). It might be noted, however, that the
Miholevich case dealt with the relatively well charted area of damages resulting from
imprisonment. See Mumford v. Starmont, 139 Mich. 188, 102 N.W. 662 (1905). It
might be contended that this makes Miholevich's contract rule less applicable to the
type of situation presented in Crisci. On the other hand, there seems to be no reason

why Miholevich should be distinguished from Crisci because the former involved
imprisonment. Both Miholevich's imprisonment and
viewed as merely evidentiary facts used to prove
damages.
29. Cf. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1008 (1964);
at 641 (3d ed. 1964).
30. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1008 (1964).
31. R S'ATEMXgNT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 435(1)

Crisci's resulting illness should be
the existence of mental suffering

W. PROSSER, LAW Os" TORTS § 93,

(1965).
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test.3 2 Basing the action in tort thus enlarges the scope of the damages
for which the insurer will be liable. Courts which are of the opinion
that damages, such as mental suffering, are too remote to be foreseeable
by the contracting parties, are free to find a sufficient degree of proximate cause to sustain recovery on a tort theory.
A number of courts have held, apart from statutory considerations
similar to those present in Crisci, that actions for an insurer's breach
of its duty to settle are in tort, not in contract. 3 In Sweeten v. National
Mutual Insurance Company of D.C.,14 the Maryland Court of Appeals
considered this question, and, though it did not decide the issue, the
court seemed to favor liability in tort. 5 If this view is adopted by the
Maryland courts, then the possibility that mental suffering damages
could be recovered in Maryland would be increased, where such damages exist 36 and are proximately caused by the insurer's breach. The
Maryland court has never decided whether mental suffering damages
can be recovered on the basis of a special contractual relationship. There
seems to be no reason why mental suffering damages should not be
recoverable when the contract is of a special, non-commercial nature,
like a liability contract. The liability insurance contract's central purpose is to protect the insured's mental tranquility. 7 To hold mental
distress to be too unforeseeable is to overlook the fundamental character
of the liability contract. The fear that insurers will be subject to fictitious
claims is not a sufficient excuse to disallow mental suffering damages."8
Such an argument addresses itself to the problem of adequate proof; all
32. Compare 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1007-08, 1010 (1950) with W. PROSSZR,
§ 50 (3d ed. 1964).
33. Carne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 346 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. 1961). See Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. Rv. 1136, 1138
n.5 (1954). See also Ertsgaard, Liability Beyond Insurance Policy Limits, 1958 INS.
L.J. 404.
34. 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963).
35. "All authorities seem to agree that the liability is in tort, not in contract,
although arising out of a contractual undertaking." Id. at 55, 194 A.2d at 818. In
Sweeten the court seems to have mixed the question of liability in tort or contract with
the question of whether the duty imposed on the insurer to settle is breached by bad
faith or negligence. In effect, they confused two issues: 1) What kind of act or failure
to act will impose liability upon the insurer (negligence or bad faith) ; and 2) once
liability is established, what is the scope of the damages recoverable (tort or contract) ?
36. Damages for mental suffering will not be allowed for mere worry or anxiety,
nor will damages be awarded if the emotional upset is accompanied only by transitory,
non-recurring physical phenomena, harmless in themselves. Cf. RISTAThMZNT (SEcoND)
or TORTS § 436A, comment c at 462 (1965). For plaintiff to recover mental suffering
damages, the emotional upset caused by the breach must result in some clearly
apparent and substantial physical injury, manifested by an external condition or by
symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological or mental state.
Cf. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
37. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967)
(The insured] did not seek by the contract... to obtain a commercial advantage
but to protect herself against the risks of accidental losses, including the mental
distress which might follow from the losses. Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and
security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss, and recovery of damages
for mental suffering has been permitted for breach of contracts which directly
concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties.
38. W. PROSSER, LAW or TORTS § 55, at 347 (3d ed. 1964): "It is now more or
less generally conceded that the only valid objection against recovery for mental injury
is the danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which has loomed very large
in the opinions as an obstacle."
LAW Ov TORTS
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mental suffering claims should not be dismissed because some might be
false.8 9 Where it can be shown that the insurer's breach has resulted
in some clear physical manifestation40 or in serious interference with
human dignity,41 mental suffering damages should be awarded.
SECURITIES REGULATION - Exchange Of Shares Incidential To Merger Held Sale Under Rule 10b-5. Dasho v. The
Susquehanna Corporation,380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967). Appellants,
shareholders in defendant corporation, sued derivatively in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of. Illinois charging
fraud in connection with the sale of securities by the directors of the
Susquehanna Corp. under Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933,1
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and Rule
lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.' Appellants alleged
39. Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by
definite physical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when
there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. The problem is one of adequate proof, and it
is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims may be false.

Id. at 347-48.
40. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 69, 77 A.2d 923, 927 (1951):

The law is now established in Maryland, in accordance With the modern trend
of the decisions, that "a plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous
shock or injury caused without physical impact, by fright arising directly from
defendant's negligent act or omission, and resulting in some clearly apparent and
substantial physical injury as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms
clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state."
41. Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202
(1933). In Miholevich, the plaintiff did not allege that his mental distress resulted
in any manifest physical injury. The court awarded mental suffering damages anyway since the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's alleged injury (his imprisonment) reasonably assured that the plaintiff's mental distress was real and serious.
Cf. Weaver v. Bank of America, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-:1. to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
2. to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
3. to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964) : "To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) :
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
a. to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b. to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c. to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
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that a group of Susquehanna's directors, known as the Lannan group,
owned 436,297 shares of Susquehanna stock. One Korholz, who controlled the American Gypsum Co., sought control of Susquehanna.
The Lannan group sold its 436,297 shares of Susquehanna stock to
the American Gypsum Co. for $1,740,000 more than the fair market
value of the stock. Subsequently, Susquehanna merged with the American Gypsum Co. and Korholz was given control of the new company,
which retained the name Susquehanna. The district court dismissed
the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 4 The court ruled that plaintiffs had
failed to state a cause of action under the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5 of the SEC in that
the sale of securities by the Lannan group to Korholz was only incidental to the Susquehanna-American Gypsum merger. Plaintiffs, not
being privy to that sale, could not protest it.' The court also held that,
although the merger itself might have directly affected plaintiffs' interests, such a merger does not involve a true "sale"" but, rather, is a
very complex transaction in which an exchange of securities is "incidental" and "involuntary."
Appellants' contention that in reality the Susquehanna-American
Gypsum merger involved either a purchase or sale of securities by the
issuing corporation, Susquehanna, within the meaning of Rule 10b-5
was upheld by a unanimous United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and was supported by an amicus curiae brief filed by the
SEC. The court of appeals dismissed the district court's reasoning
as an exercise in semantics which failed to take into account the
economic realities of the situation and the public policy behind the
federal securities legislation. The Securities Exchange Act, in Section
3a,' defines "purchase" and "sale" -to include contracts to "acquire"
or "dispose of" securities. This definition, the court concluded, should
be broadly interpreted to include transactions in which no exchange of
cash is involved. Under the actual mechanics of the merger, Gypsum
stockholders received one share of Susquehanna stock for every 1.9
shares of their Gypsum stock. This, in effect, constituted both a "sale"
by Susquehanna of its own securities to Gypsum's shareholders and a
"purchase" by Susquehanna of its own securities in acquiring the Gypsum stock. Since the net effect of the transaction resulted in Susque4. Dasho v. The Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
5. But see 3 L. Loss, SECURIrIES IJULATION 1767 (2d ed. 1961). The author,
in discussing the privity requirement in actions for common law fraud and under
lOb-5 says, "Analysis of the rule . . . indicates that the mere absence of privity
between plaintiff and defendant should not of itself be fatal."

6. 267 F. Supp. at 511. Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission expressly excludes mergers and consolidations from its definition of a "sale." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.133 (1967). The application of the rule is, however, limited by the strict terms
of the rule to cases arising under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1964), which requires registration as a prerequisite to a lawful sale of securities.
"Whether or not a sale is involved for any other purpose will depend upon the
statutory context, and the question should in no sense be influenced by the rule."
1 CCH FED. Sgec. L. R9P. ff 3090.565, at 3077. Rule 133 does not, thus, affect the
question of whether a merger or consolidation should be a "sale" within the meaning
of Rule 10b-5. See I L. Loss, SgCURITES RGULATION 518-42 (2d ed. 1961).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 7Be(a)(13)-(14) (1964).
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hanna's assumption of the loan that Gypsum had taken out to purchase
the Lannan group's overvalued stock, Susquehanna actually acquired
securities at a price of about $1,740,000 in excess of their fair market
value. Appellants, as shareholders of Susquehanna, suffered a real
financial loss. The court concluded that since the purpose' of the
federal securities legislation was to protect investors and the buying
public, a broad interpretation of Rule lOb-5 was in order.
Corporate mergers involve extremely complex financial transactions which if fraudulently managed can result in great injury to shareholders. Historically, the defrauded stockholder's remedy has been an
action in state courts based on a breach of the corporate directors' common law fiduciary duties. However, the SEC and the federal courts
are assuming an increasingly active role in the policing of the internal
affairs of interstate corporations. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the rules promulgated by the SEC are the source of federal
jurisdiction in these cases. Much of the law has been made on the district court level, generally in conjunction with the SEC as amicus
curiae.' "Since its passage in 1942, Rule lOb-5 has received significant
judicial amplification as a basis for civil liability."'" To establish federal
jurisdiction in a cause of action predicated on Rule lOb-5, three acts
must be proved and the proper causal relation among them established:
"1. Use of mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
2. Purchase or sale of a security.
3. Use of a manipulative or deceptive device.""
It was the alleged absence of the second requirement1 2 on which the
defendant's claim of lack of jurisdiction was based.
8. In Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
a corporate issuer of stock was held to be a "seller" within the scope of lOb-5. The
court in its determination of the policy underlying lOb-5 stated: "Quite obviously, the
broad purpose of this legislation was to keep the channels of interstate commerce,
the mail, and national securities exchanges pure from fraudulent schemes, tricks,
devices, and all forms of manipulation." Id. at 202.
9. 3 L. Loss, StCURrIrrs RzGULATION 1935 (2d ed. 1961).
10. Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
Plaintiff, suing derivatively, alleged fraud in connection with a corporate merger. The
court held that fraud had been sufficiently alleged to withstand a motion to dismiss.
The existence of a private remedy under Rule lOb-5 was first recognized in Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
The right of defrauded shareholders to sue derivatively under lOb-5 has been sustained
in the more recent cases, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964) ; McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Kane v. Central
American Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This right was
acknowledged in O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), but the action in
that case was dismissed because the required deception was not present. See Lowenfels,
Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 18 VAND. L. Rev. 893 (1965).
11. Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1962). The requirement of
deception appears to have been abandoned in Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), in which a shareholder's derivative suit under lOb-5 was successful even where
there was no deception practiced on the corporation on whose behalf the suit was
brought. See Note, Purchaser-Sellerand Deception Elements not Strict Prerequisites
to Liability in Civil Action Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rgv. 978 (1967).
12. Corporate issuance of stock has been held included within the scope of "sale"
under Rule 10b-5. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
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In National Supply Company v. Leland Stanford University,3 a
corporate merger was held not to involve a sale of securities under Rule
10b-5; the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief urging the federal court
not to take jurisdiction. By 1952, in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corporation,4 the SEC had come full circle in its interpretation of the
extent of federal jurisdiction under 10b-5. That case involved the
failure by the president of the defendant corporation to disclose to
stockholders a merger proposition that would have been very advantageous to the company. Instead, the president sold his 40% interest
in the company to another corporation for twice its market value. As
a result, the purchasing corporation obtained control of the company
and used its productive capacity as a captive source of supply. The
SEC, again as amicus curiae, reversed its 1943 position and asked for
a finding of a violation of 10b-5. The court held that 10b-5 applied
only to fraud perpetrated on actual purchasers or sellers of securities
and did not apply to fraudulent mismanagement of internal corporate
affairs. The essence of the decision in both cases was that plaintiffs,
as stockholders, had not been defrauded into a purchase or sale of their
own securities.
The merger of one corporation with another or the consolidation
of two corporations to form a third is generally accomplished by an
exchange of securities. It has been the position of the SEC since 1952
that such an exchange is a sale of securities and thus falls within the
act's anti-fraud provisions.
In H. L. Green Company v. Childree,'5 stock of one corporation
was exchanged for undervalued stock of another pursuant to a merger
agreement. The court held that a sale within the meaning of 10b-5 had
occurred. However, the court went on to state that " 'merger' is not
a term of fixed and definite content. A transaction properly so described may or may not involve a purchase and sale within the meaning
of Section 10-b of the Act."' 6 In Sawyer v. Pioneer Mill Company,'7
a merger agreement similar to the one described in Green, was held not
to involve a sale of securities. A merger scheme in which stockholders
of one corporation were fraudulently misled into surrendering their
shares for a price far below their real value was held in Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation,' to give rise to a cause of
action under 10b-5. In Cohen v. Calvin,'9 an amalgamation agreement
between two corporations called for a transfer of the shares of one to
Cir. 1960). See also Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), an
action based on Rule 10b-5 in which a corporation was defrauded into selling its
securities through the refusal of some interested directors to fully disclose material
facts concerning the transaction. The stockholders of the defrauded corporation were
held to have standing to sue in federal court From this it is but a short step to hold
that a transfer of securities pursuant to a consLpiracy among corporate directors to
loot a corporation or to gain control thereof is also an unlawful sale or purchase.
See 3 L. Loss, SgCURITIS RAGULATION 1469 (2d ed. 1961).
13. 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 773 (1943).
14. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
15. 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. Id. at 96.
17. 190 F. Supp. 21 (D. Hawaii 1960).
18. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.Del. 1965).
19. 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the other. This was held not to be a sale of stock to the defendant
corporation's stockholders." °
A merger scheme similar to the one alleged in Dasho was held to
involve a sale for the purposes of Rule 10b-5 in Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Company.21 In that case, the defendant corporation, after purchasing shares 'belonging to the directors of a smaller finance company
at an inflated price, merged the smaller company into its wholly-owned
subsidiary. Pursuant to the merger, the minority shareholders of the
smaller company were to be paid a cash price for their shares which was
considerably less than fair market value. Plaintiff, one of the minority
shareholders, brought an action under 10b-5. Because plaintiff had not
yet exchanged his shares in the smaller company for cash, the district
court dismissed ,the action on the grounds that plaintiff was not a
"seller." Recognizing that the plaintiff, in order to realize any value
from his stock, would be forced to exchange it for the cash price offered
by defendant corporation or for a price determined in an appraisal suit,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court
decision. When plaintiff exchanged his worthless shares for cash, the
court reasoned, a sale would occur and the federal courts would have
jurisdiction under 10b-5. Jurisdiction was thus based on the certainty
of this forced future sale by the plaintiff.22
Because Dasho was a derivative action, the cause of action brought
by the plaintiff was in reality that of the corporation. Thus, it was not
necessary to show that a sale was made by the individual plaintiff;
proof of a sale or purchase by Susquehanna would be sufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction under 10b-5. In order to conclude that the exchange
of shares pursuant to the merger was a sale for the purposes of 10b-5,
the Dasho court was compelled to adopt a definition of "sale" which was
broader than that demanded by the factual situation in Vine. In Vine,
the future forced sale on which jurisdiction was based was a "sale" in
the sense that the "term has always been used,"2 in that it involved a
straight exchange of securities for cash. In Dasho, however, the exchange of stock pursuant to the merger was not a "sale" in the ordinary
sense of the word, since no cash was involved. Unable to rely on the
accepted definition of "sale," the Dasho court, in order to find that the
exchange of securities was a sale under 10b-5, extended the definition
of "sale," for the purposes of the rule, beyond the accepted common law
meaning of the word.
20. The court relied on O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), a case
involving an exchange of stock between two corporations at a ratio unfavorable to one.
In holding that a violation of Rule lOb-5 had not been proved, the court limited itself
to the precise issue that deception in connection with the proposed exchange had not
been established. The court expressly reserved determination of whether lOb-5 covers
the situation in which a sufficient allegation of deception is shown to be causally connected with" a proposed merger.

21. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).

22. A finding that the plaintiff in Vine was a party to a sale would have been
unnecessary if the court had accepted the argument, advanced by the SEC as amicus
curiae, "that plaintiff need not even be a selling stockholder to sue under lOb-5, so
long as the Rule has been violated and plaintiff's stock lost value as a result." Id.
at 636.
23. Id. at 634.
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Although Vine and Dasho both expanded the protection afforded
by Rule lOb-5 to securities transactions incidental to mergers, both
cases did so within the basic purchaser-seller framework established
in Birnbaum. By recognizing that "the complex nature of a merger
enhances the opportunities for fraud and thus increases the need for
anti-fraud protection,"2' 4 the Dasho court has broadened the scope of
federal jurisdiction under Rule lOb-5 to include exchanges of securities
made pursuant to the terms of a merger. In doing so, the court has
further expanded what some have called the source of a growing
federal corporation law.2 5
SECURITIES REGULATION-Shareholder Who Was Neither
Purchaser Nor Seller Given Injunctive Relief Under Rule 10b-5.
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
Plaintiffs purchased stock in S.H. Kress and Company after the
defendants had obtained the controlling interest in Kress and while
the defendants were attempting to obtain the remainder of the outstanding shares through tender offers.' Plaintiffs alleged that subsequent to their purchases they learned that the defendants were engaged
in a manipulative scheme to depress the value of Kress stock by minimizing dividends. This scheme had originated with the intent of inducing the holders of outstanding shares to accept the defendant's
tender offer. The tender offer had been withdrawn shortly after the
plaintiffs made their purchases, but the manipulations allegedly continued, for the same purpose.
The plaintiffs brought an action under Rule lOb-5 which implements Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act.2 The trial court
24. 380 F.2d at 267.
25. It has been suggested that Rule 10b-5 has become the source of a substantive
federal law of corporations. See Fleischer, Federal CorporationLaw: An Assessment,
78 HARV. L. Riv. 1146 (1965) ; Note, Securities Regulation Rule 10b-5 - A Federal
Corporations Law?, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 637 (1965).
1. See generally Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under
Federal Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. Cui. L. Rvv. 359
(1966).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j:
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . , or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(a) . . .
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949):
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
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dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction since the plaintiffs had not
actually sold securities in reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations. 3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
claim for damages because of the absence of an allegation that there
had been fraud or misrepresentation which had been relied upon in
making the purchase.' However, the court held that the trial court
had erred in dismissing one of the counts of the complaint in which
the plaintiffs charged a continuing manipulative scheme in violation
of Rule lOb-5 and requested injunctive relief. The court pointed out
that " '[d] eceitful manipulation of the market price of publicly-owned
stock is precisely one of the types of injury to investors at which the
Act and the Rule were aimed'." 5
Rule lOb-5, adopted by the Commission under its power to declare unlawful the use of any manipulative or deceptive device, 6 has
been at the center of the expansion of civil liability for transactions
in securities.7 It should be noted, however, that there is no express
grant of a private right of action for a breach of Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act, and it has been argued that since civil liability has been specifically provided for in Sections 118 and 12' of the
Securities Act, along with specific criteria for bringing such actions,
Congress did not intend a private right of action under 10b.'" Nevertheless, the courts, with few exceptions," have construed the statute
to grant such a right. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 2 a federal
district court first held that a private right of action for a violation
of Rule 10b-5 would lie. The exact theory relied on in Kardon was
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
The SEC gave the following reasons for adopting the Rule:
The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied
only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protection
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942.
3. 266 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court also held that the Kress Co.
was an indispensable party, but would destroy the diversity required for action by a
federal court.
4. 384 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967). During the period after plaintiffs' purchase
the only fraudulent activities for which damages were sought were corporate abuse
and diversion, cognizable under state law. See N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 720 (McKinney
1963). The case was remanded to the district court for presentation of evidence in
support of the claim for injunctive relief.
5. 384 F.2d at 549.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b), quoted note 1 supra.
7. See 3 L. Loss, S;CURITIES REGULATION 1623 (2d ed. 1961); A. Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1965); see
generally A. BROMBURG, SXCURITrms LAW, FRAUD, SEC RULe lOb-5, §§ 6, 9 (1967).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1934).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1934).
10. 3 L. Loss, StCURITIeS IRGULATION 1784-87 (2d ed. 1961). See also Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule lob-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 7 Nw.
U.L. R v. 627 (1963).
11. Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., Inc., 3 CCH F4o. Sec. L. RPE.
J 91,996 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1967) (Purchasers do not have a right of action under
lOb-5).
12. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVIII

not clearly enunciated, and other courts, while citing the decision with
approval, have expressed varying bases for its holding.'" Although
the Supreme Court has not been presented with a lOb-5 case, it has
given tacit approval to the broad theory of implied liability by allowing
a private action under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act.' 4
The Court's reasoning in reaching that conclusion would seem to apply
to other sections of the Act as well.
The popularity of 10b-5 actions among injured shareholders is
probably related to the apparent ease in stating a cause of action for a
violation of the Rule. All that is required is an allegation of fraud
in connection with a stock transaction made by the use of the mails or of
an interstate, or stock exchange, facility. By varying constructions of
the Rule, however, the courts have attempted to place limitations on
its applicability similar to the elements of common law fraud.
The requirements of materiality of the misrepresentation, reliance,
and privity have been imposed.' 5 The lack of privity has ceased to be
controlling in the majority of cases because of the apparent legislative
intent to protect the investor dealing in the open market where there is
no privity. 16 Materiality of the misrepresentation is, of course, required
by the Rule itself and is generally an important factual issue in the
litigation. 1 7 The requirement of reliance has been linked to that of
materiality by the courts in many situations, but it would appear that
merely the mention of the word "reliance" in the8 complaint will satisfy
the court that a cause of action has been stated.'
A final limitation imposed by the courts is that the defrauded
party be either a buyer or a seller. 19 In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
13. See A.

BROMBERG, SECURITIs LAW, FRAUD,

SEC RuLE lOb-5, § 2.4 (1967).

14. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See note 24 infra and accompanying text. Section 14 contains no express grant of a private civil right of action

against violators.
15. 384 F.2d at 543-44.
16. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES

LAW, FRAUD,

3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1767-71

SEC RULE lOb-5, § 8.5 (1967);

(1961);

Note, Civil Liability Under

Section 10B and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion For Replacing The Doctrine of Privity,
74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).

17. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, at § 8.3; 3 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1431,
1438-39; Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities
Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHi. L. Rrv. 359, 364 (1966).
18. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1765-66; A. BROMBERG, supra note 16, at § 8.3.
19. The usual basis for a suit by the buyer is that he was persuaded to take the
stock as the result of some sort of fraudulent activity of the defendant. A seller will
sue if he finds that he has sold his stock for less than its true value because of something the defendant had said or failed to say in inducing the sale. As the cases and
the commentators indicate, the boundaries of fraud have been greatly extended by the
courts in applying Rule lOb-5 to varying fact situations. See A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW, FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5, § 1.1 (1967). It is apparent that the plaintiffs in the
instant case do not fit into either of the conventional categories. Voege v. American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), presents an example of the
great lengths to which a court will go to establish the plaintiff as a "seller" and
thereby bring him within the protection of Rule lOb-5. The case presented the
problem of a stockholder who refused a tender offer and subsequently had his shares
converted into a claim for cash. (Control of the corporation shifted to the party
making the tender offer who then caused a merger with another corporation).
Relying on Delaware corporate law and contract theory, the court held that plaintiff
was a "seller" under the rationale that when plaintiff bought shares in the original
company, over 20 years before, she agreed that in the event of a merger the corporation surviving the merger should have an option to buy her shares at a price to be
determined in the future. In order to establish reliance and deception to bring the
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Corp.,2" an influential Second Circuit opinion, plaintiff stockholders
brought both a class and derivative action, alleging specific acts of fraud
and a breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of the controlling interests in the corporation by one of its officer-directors.
Another combination which would have been profitable to the shareholders had been rejected, while letters were sent to the stockholders
indicating that negotiations for the advantageous merger had been
suspended due to uncertain international conditions. The plaintiffs
sought an accounting, an injunction against the sale of the corporation,
and a declaration voiding the sale of the officer-director's shares. The
plaintiffs argued that the applicability of lOb-5 was not limited to purchasers and sellers of securities but that the prohibition of fraud on
"any person" includes the common law liabilities of those who abuse
their corporate positions and that this theory harmonized with the
broad purpose of the Act which is to protect investors from exploitation by corporate insiders. The court rejected the argument and stated:
When Congress intended to protect the stockholders of a corporation against a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders, it
left no doubt as to its meaning. Thus section 16b of the Act of
1934 ...expressly gave the corporate issuer or its stockholders a
right of action against corporate insiders using their position to
profit in the sale or exchange of corporate securities. The absence
of a similar provision in 10b strengthens the conclusion that that
section was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs, and that rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to the
defrauded purchaser or seller.2"
action within Rule 10b-5, the court found that when the plaintiff acquired her stock
she justifiably assumed that any merger would deal with her fairly, and not, as the
complaint alleged, attempt to defraud her. 241 F. Supp. at 374. In the recent case
of Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967), where the
plaintiffs filed a derivative suit to enjoin further activities by the defendants who
were exchanging evidence of ownership certificates for stock in an attempt to set
up a voting trust in the plaintiff corporation, the court held that an action could not
be brought under Rule 10b-5. The court found that because plaintiff was neither a
buyer nor a seller, it was not a member of the class to be protected by the statute.
20. 193 F.2d 461 (1952).
21. 193 F.2d at 464. In light of the amount of litigation arising under Rule lOb-5
the following comments by its drafter, Milton Freeman, are of interest:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional
Administrator in Boston, and he has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his own
shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is
doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and
will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it ?"
So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b)
and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we
had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we
decided it should be at the end.
ABA Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18, 19, 1966),
BusINzss LAwYxR, April, 1967, at 922.
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In a more recent decision, the Second Circuit, for the first time,
granted injunctive relief under lOb-5 in a derivative suit to prevent the
issuance of corporate stock in Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.22 Here
the facts brought the case clearly within the fraud requirements of the
rule. In face-to-face dealings among members of the board of directors,
one group, by withholding the latest financial statement, persuaded
the others that it was in the best interests of the corporation to issue
additional stock. It subsequently developed that only the conspiring
group of directors was intended to benefit by obtaining the new issue
of stock for themselves at less than its true value. The success of the
plaintiffs' suit was related to a prior decision which had held that
issuance of stock by a corporation was a "sale" within the meaning
of the Securities Exchange Act.23
In 1964, the Supreme Court handed down broad guidelines to the
federal courts concerning appropriate remedies in cases of securities
litigation. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,24 the plaintiff alleged that false
and misleading proxy statements had been used to effect a merger. In
rejecting a challenge to Borak's standing and to the nature of the relief
being sought under Section 14(a) of the Act, the general anti-fraudprovision relating to proxy solicitation, the Court viewed Section 2725
as granting private parties the right to sue for violations of 14a. The
Court, noting that the SEC has as its primary function the enforcement of its regulations for the protection of the investor but that as a
practical matter limitations of manpower and resources make complete
protection impossible, concluded that private enforcement of the proxy
rules would provide a necessary and effective supplement to Commission action.2 6 The Court then expressed the view that "under the
circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose." 27 The Court's reasoning suggests that it may view Section
22. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).

23. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
24. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
25. Section 27 is the jurisdictional provision giving the district courts and the
United States courts of any territory exclusive jurisdiction of violations of the Act and
its rules and regulations. These courts also have exclusive jurisdictions of all suits to
enforce any liability under the Act.
26. The Court noted that SEC had examined over 2000 proxy statements the
previous year, and that as a practical matter, the assertions made in the proxy statements had to be taken at face value, unless contrary to some other information on file
with the Commission. An independent discovery by the SEC of the alleged market
manipulations on the part of the defendant Genesco would seem unlikely. The majority
of the transactions in the stock would not have appeared in market statistics, and a
detailed analysis would have had to have been made of Kress' financial position, and
dealings to reveal the manipulative activity alleged by plaintiffs. See Cary, Recent
Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 COLUm. L. Riv. 857, 858-59 (1963), for
an unofficial comment by former SEC Chairman W.L. Cary made in reply to a
proposal that the SEC should attempt to recover corporate profits under § 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act: "In the time I have spent at the Commission, I have
become increasingly convinced that whenever we enact . . . an anti-fraud type of
law . . . that can be prosecuted by private citizens instead of the government, it is all
to the good. I say this, first, because I do not think we have any business getting
into such a broad spectrum of litigation, and second, because of the problem. . . of budget, which makes [the] .. .proposal difficult, if not impossible, as a practical matter."
27. 377 U.S. at 433.
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27 as allowing a private party to enforce any liability or duty under
the Act.
Against this background the Second Circuit was presented in the
instant case with shareholders seeking relief who were not induced to
purchase or sell their stock as a result of the fraud or misrepresentation
of the defendant and where the only "purchase or sale" bringing the
case under lOb-5 was the defendant's purchase of stock from other
shareholders at depressed prices. On these facts, the trial court, in
accord with the rationale of Birnbaum, viewed the complaint solely as
an allegation of corporate mismanagement under state law, and not
an action under lOb-5, since the plaintiff had not sold their stock in
reliance on the defendants' activities. Nevertheless, as to the claim
for injunctive relief, the circuit court ignored Birnbaum, adopted an
expansive view of Borak, and read its rationale into Section 10b:
[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their
stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. .

.

. While

doubtless the Commission could seek to halt such practices, present
stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play 'an important role
in the enforcement' of the Act in this way. . . . Since private
parties have the right to sue for violation of the Rule, the broad
remedial purposes of the Act suggest that the judicial relief available should not be limited to a particular type of remedy."
By granting injunctive relief to an injured shareholder who is
neither a purchaser nor seller, the court in ill/utual Shares has taken
another step in expanding the remedies available to private plaintiffs
under l0b-5. At least one commentator has viewed this expansion
with alarm.2 9 This concern proceeds on the theory that the extension
of liability for corporate insiders under 10b-5 should not take place
in an ad hoc manner on the ground that this mode of extension does
not sufficiently recognize competing considerations, such as the insider's
difficulty in compliance and the possible adverse effects on business
investment generally.30 The ultimate conclusion reached is that Congress, not the judiciary, should be the agency to determine the scope of
28. 384 F.2d at 546-47. The only question that remains, and it is left to the
district court to determine, is what form the injunction will take. In issuing an injunction restraining individuals from violations of the securities laws, the overriding
consideration is the protection of the investing public, and the injunction when granted
is not intended to be punitive. SEC v. Northeastern Financial Corp., 268 F. Supp. 412
(D.N.J. 1967). The SEC action generally results in a consent injunction, the provisions of which closely follow the prohibitory language of the statute, although
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions designed to preserve assets have also
been issued. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIAS RGULATION, 1981 n.31 (2d ed. 1961). It should
be apparent that the alleged manipulations involving reductions in dividend payments
will present a very complex financial situation to the trial court. An additional factor
which seems to complicate the case is the absence of the Kress corporation from the
proceedings. Corporate dividend policy is generally vested in the board of directors,
and an injunction directed at halting the alleged manipulative scheme would seem to
necessarily involve all the directors of Kress.
29. Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations Through
Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 185 (1965).
30. Id. at 208-14.
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the securities laws. Others,3 ' and apparently the Second Circuit as well,
take the position that the recognition of new procedural rights of action,
which do not change the primary duties created by the statute, are
justifiable in that no new burdens on corporate management are created
since the Commission has enforced these duties in the past."
31. Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. Rev.
1146, 1173 (1965).
32. Securities Exchange Act, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964), authorizes the
Commission to bring an injunction whenever:
[I]t shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage
in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provision of [the Act], or of any rule or regulation thereunder....
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), the Commission argued
that the plaintiff need not be a selling shareholder to sue under 10b-5, so long as there
had been fraudulent activity and the plaintiff's stock had decreased in value as a result.

